


## TRANSCRIPT (& VIDEO): Clinton Curtis' Sworn Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, 12/13/2004

[https://www.bradblog.com/?page\\_id=9437](https://www.bradblog.com/?page_id=9437)

**EXCERPTS:** Transcript of sworn testimony by computer programmer Clint Curtis, before the U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Democrats of the Judiciary Committee, December 13, 2004, as seen on video above follows below.

For the full compendium of our Clint Curtis/Tom Feeney vote-rigging scandal, which we originally broke on December 6, 2004, please see: <https://BradBlog.com/ClintCurtis>.



Attorney Cliff Arnebeck called Clint Curtis before the Committee, for the purpose of determining if the vote-counting process of the 2004 U.S. General Election in Ohio could have been manipulated by computer. ...

... ARNEBECK: And what is your profession?

CURTIS: I'm a computer programmer. ....

... ARNEBECK: Mr Curtis, are there programs that can be used to secretly fix elections?

CURTIS: Yes.

ARNEBECK: How do you know that to be the case?

CURTIS: Because in October of 2000 I wrote a prototype for present Congressman Tom Feeney, at the company I work for in Oviedo, Florida, that did just that.

ARNEBECK: And when you say, "Did just that," it would rig an election?

CURTIS: It would flip the vote fifty-one forty-nine to whoever you wanted it to go to, and whichever race you wanted it to win.

ARNEBECK: And would that program that you designed be something that elections officials, that might be on county boards of elections, could detect?

CURTIS: They'd never see it.

[Audience: "Hmmm!"] ...

... ARNEBECK: So how would such a program, a secret program that fixes the election, how could it be detected?

CURTIS: You would have to view it either in the source code, or you'd have to have a receipt, and then count the hard paper against the actual vote total. Other than that, you won't see it. ...

... ARNEBECK: No, could you have designed a program, a procedure, a protocol, that would have protected Ohio against this kind of rigging?

CURTIS: No, you have to look at the source code. You have to get, probably, programmers from both, or all, parties to look at the source code, and determine if there's anything in there that shouldn't be there. I mean, it's a simple program, you're adding one, two persons total. It's a hundreds lines of code, tops. There's.. [unintelligible] ...

... ARNEBECK: OK. Given the availability of such vote-rigging software, and the testimony that has been given under oath of substantial statistical anomalies, and gross differences between exit polling data and the actual tabulated results, do you have an opinion whether or not the Ohio election, the Presidential election, was hacked?

CURTIS: Yes I would say it was. I mean, if you ... have exit polling data that is significantly off from the vote, then it's probably hacked.

...

... REP. STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES What did you say you were asked to prepare?

CURTIS: I was asked by Tom Feeney, he's now Congressman, at that time he was Speaker of the House of Florida; Yang Enterprises' --- which is the company I worked for --- lobbyist, and their corporate attorney. He wore a lotta hats. ...

... REP. JERROLD NADLER: And he asked you to design a code to rig an election?

CURTIS: Yes.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: While he was Speaker of the Florida House?

CURTIS: Yes.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: Was that during, or previous to, the 2000 election?

CURTIS: Yes, October, end of September.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: Did he ever express why he wanted the code to rig an election?

CURTIS: No. I immediately assumed that they were trying to keep you guys from cheating on them. [Audience laughs.] So I wrote up the documentation of what you would look for in the source code, how you would make sure that you didn't get, you know, taken advantage of, make sure that all voting machines had receipts, because that way you could back count the ones that looked funny.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: By "receipts," you mean a paper trail?

CURTIS: Yes, paper trail. And I handed that in to Mrs. Yang and said, "Here's your report, here's your program." And she said, "You don't understand. We need to hide the fraud in the source, in the source code."

REP. JERROLD NADLER: Hide the fraud, not reveal it?

CURTIS: Not reveal the fraud. "Because we need it to control the vote in South Florida." That's what she said.

[Audience: "Woh!!!" ] ...

... CURTIS: Either or both. Because since you didn't actually see what's in there. So you don't actually know if the code is running in single executable, or running in various modules. If it's running in modules, you can make the code actually eat itself.

[Audience murmurs, then "Wow!"] ...

... REP. JERROLD NADLER: So if you, so one person putting in bad code in a central tabulation machine could affect thousands and thousands, or tens of thousands, of votes?

CURTIS: Right. And you could activate it ...

[Congressman Nadler starts to speak, but stops]

CURTIS: ... you could activate it either automatically, or you could make it so that there's code existing on like an automatic [?] machine that feeds it, where you would punch it in, it would set the flag, server would receive the flag, and then...

REP. JERROLD NADLER: And if you had a recount ... [unclear] ... no paper trail --- assuming that would happen --- would that be revealable by seeing a discrepancy between what the tabulator, the central tabulator trail [unclear] the individual machines which had not been tampered with, have?

CURTIS: Not if I wrote it.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: Why not?

CURTIS: I would make it match.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: You could work back from the tabulator to the individual machines? So the tabulator would tell the machines to switch their results?

CURTIS: Yes. It talks both ways. You can flip it to do whatever you need.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: And they actually do talk to each other, the machines...?

CURTIS: Yes, once it's hooked up, if it's networked together, they can talk to each other.

REP. JERROLD NADLER: So there's absolutely no assurance whatsoever that anything could be [right?] with these machines?

CURTIS: Absolutely none, unless you look at the source code, and make sure it's safe before it goes out. ...

[End]

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## 2022-12-27 Return to Hand Counting, Missouri Elections, eManual 3h transcript (otter.ai)\_HL



Dr. Douglas C Frank excerpt: "... Like to tell another story was just in Wisconsin, and I met No, I'm sorry. I was in Colorado, as in this tiny County, if 1500 voters in this county, and I met with the clerk and she said and I showed her the fraud that was happening in her own county and she was very disappointed about it because you know, she thinks she's running a good election. So, he says, you know, Dr. Frank, I've been doing this for 30 years. And 30 years ago, I ran the election just fine. Took me a few a few weeks. To get prepared. I did everything on paper. I can monitor everything. And you know, I we got the ballots counted by hand. We had everything documented, everything was transparent. We could audit everything. She says you know what Dr. Frank it was so simple. back then. We we were in and out. We had done the election and it was done and everything was transparent and auditable. She says you know what, guess how many people we have today? Dr. Frank, 30 years later, we still have 1500 voters in our small county, but you know what? Now it takes me months and months to do the work. Weeks and weeks afterwards. I don't understand all this technology. She says and we're spending all this money and nobody trusts it and everybody thinks I'm the bad guy. So why am I telling you that story? I think your small counties are your best chance. You've got small counties that they know. Used to be simple. It can be simple. Again, we want it simple again."

Bill Wiesner / Leelanau County Resident &

[www.TCFamily.org](http://www.TCFamily.org) Founder

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